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Abstract
We give an overview of the diverse electoral systems used in local,
national, or super-national elections around the world. We discuss exist-
ing methods for selecting single and multiple winners and give real-world
examples for some more elaborate systems. Eventually, we elaborate on
some of the better known strengths and weaknesses of various methods
from both the theoretical and practical points of view.
1 Introduction
An electoral system, or simply a voting method, defines the rules by which the
choices or preferences of voters are collected, tallied, aggregated, and collectively
interpreted to obtain the results of an election [49, 73].
There are many electoral systems. A voter may be allowed to vote for one
or multiple candidates, one or multiple predefined lists of candidates, or state
their preference among candidates or predefined lists of candidates. Accordingly,
tallying may involve a simple count of the number of votes for each candidate
or list, or a relatively more complex procedure of multiple rounds of counting
and transferring ballots between candidates or lists. Eventually, the outcome
of the tallying and aggregation procedures is interpreted to determine which
candidate wins which seat.
Designing end-to-end verifiable e-voting schemes is challenging. Indeed, most
such schemes are initially designed to support relatively unsophisticated voting
methods in which ballot structure and tallying rules are straightforward. How-
ever, extending such a scheme to support more complex voting methods may
not be trivial. Issues such as efficiently encoding preferential ballots with a
large number of candidates and preserving voter privacy when transferring bal-
lots during multiple rounds of counting can introduce considerable design chal-
lenges. Such challenges are evidenced for instance by the compromises made in
∗This is a personally archived version of a chapter by the same title [80] contributed to
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the design of the state-of-the-art vVote system used for recent Victorian elec-
tions [37]. There has been a few works attempting to address these challenges
(see e.g., [85] and the references within), nevertheless achieving practical end-
to-end verifiable schemes supporting complex voting methods remains an area
of research with many open questions. A good understanding of how different
voting methods work is a prerequisite for tackling such open questions. In this
chapter we aim to provide an introduction to the diverse voting methods used
around the world.
Mathematically, an electoral system can be seen as a function that takes as
input the choices or preferences of the voters and produces as output the results
of the election. Voting theory, and more broadly social choice theory, provides
a formal framework for the study of different electoral systems, and in general
social choice functions. A social choice function in this framework is a function
that takes as input a set of individual orderings of a set of alternatives and
produces a social ordering of the alternatives. This formalisation was first put
forth by Arrow [27], a pioneer of modern voting theory.
In practice however, there is much more to an election than just the elec-
toral system, and these other issues are equally (if not more) important as the
choice of the electoral system in ensuring fair and free elections and establishing
public trust. Among these issues are (pre-election) voter registration, observer
missions during the election, and post-election audits. From a legal point of
view, the electoral system is only one part of the much wider electoral laws and
regulations which govern the rules and procedures involved in calling, running,
and finalising an election from the start to the end. These rules and procedures
include those of voter eligibility, candidate nomination, party campaigning, elec-
tion administration, and announcement of results. In this chapter however, we
mainly focus on electoral systems.
Electoral systems can be categorised in multiple different ways. Two com-
mon criteria for categorisation are whether the system is designed to produce
one winner or multiple winners, and whether the system is designed to pro-
duce results that are roughly proportional to the vote share of each party or
the system is based on the “winner takes all” approach. In the remaining of
this chapter however we have chosen not to be bound to such categorisations.
Instead, we follow the ideas underlying different electoral systems and work our
way from the more immediate design ideas to the more elaborate ones.
2 Some Solutions to Electing A Single Winner
Perhaps the most natural solution to elect a single winner is to elect the candi-
date with the most votes. This idea is the basis of the so-called first-past-the-
post electoral system.
In a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, each voter can vote for one can-
didate and the single candidate with the highest number of votes wins. The
winner might achieve an absolute majority of votes (i.e., more than a half), or
merely a plurality of votes (i.e., most votes relatively). The system is also known
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as single-member plurality (SMP) or simple plurality. In the case of a
race with only two candidates such a system is also called a simple majority
system.
First-past-the-post is used among other places in USA presidential elections
(48 states) [32], UK lower house elections [64], Canada [60], India [54], and
Malaysia [52].
There are variants of the first-past-the-post system that require the winning
candidate to achieve a quota, i.e., a threshold of votes, which is higher than the
natural quota. For instance, in a two-candidate election, the winning candidate
might be required to receive a quota which is greater than half of the votes: in
the United States upper house, a so-called filibuster preventing legislation may
be stopped only if the legislation receives three-fifth of the votes [46]. These
systems are sometimes called quota systems, and in the case of a two-candidate
election a super-majority system.
Note that in the first-past-the-post system, each voter is restricted to vote
for only one candidate. If this restriction is lifted, the resulting system is called
approval voting.
In an approval voting system, each voter may vote for (i.e., approve of)
any number of candidates and the single candidate with the highest number of
votes (i.e., approvals) wins.
Approval voting is used among other places by the Mathematical Association
of America [20], the Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences [19], and the American Statistical Association [18].
Although first-past-the-post provides a simple solution to elect a single win-
ner, it does not guarantee an absolute majority if there are more than two
candidates. One way to make sure that the winner receives an absolute major-
ity is to choose the two candidates with the most votes for a second round of
voting.
In a two-round system (TRS), each voter votes for one candidate. If a
candidate receives more than half of the votes, they are declared as the winner.
Otherwise, the two candidates with the highest number of votes are chosen as
the only candidates for a second round of voting, and the rest of the candidates
are eliminated. In the second round, each voter can vote for one of the two
remaining candidates, and the candidate with the highest number of votes wins.
The system is sometimes abbreviated as 2RS and is also known as run-off
voting and double-ballot.
The two-round system is used in many countries to elect members of the
parliament and directly-elected presidents, e.g., in both presidential elections
and lower house elections in France [42].
There are other variations of TRS in which all candidates receiving a certain
quota become eligible for the second round, or a candidate can be declared a
winner in the first round if they meet certain conditions, e.g., achieve a certain
quota and have a certain lead over the second candidate.
To avoid the cost of a second round of voting, an idea is to ask voters for
their preferences between the candidates on the ballot.
In the contingent vote system, voters rank the candidates in order of
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preference. The ballots are then distributed between the candidates based on
their first preference votes. If a candidate receives more than half of the ballots
(i.e., the first preference votes), they are declared as the winner. Otherwise, the
two candidates with the highest number of first preference votes are chosen as the
only candidates for a second round of counting, and the rest of the candidates are
eliminated. In the second round of counting, the ballots stating an eliminated
candidate as the first preference are re-distributed (or transferred) to one of
the two remaining candidates based on which candidate is ranked above the
other. Eventually, the candidate with the highest number of votes is declared
the winner.
A variant of the contingent vote where the voters are restricted to express
only their top two preferences is used to elect the directly elected mayors in
England, including the Mayor of London [23]. Another variant where the voters
are restricted to express only their top three preferences is used in the Sri Lankan
presidential elections [70, p. 135]. Note that these variants do not guarantee an
absolute majority for the winner.
An alternative to ensure an absolute majority for the winner is to carry out
multiple rounds of voting and in each round only eliminate the candidate with
the lowest number of votes.
In the exhaustive ballot system, the voter may vote for one candidate of
their choice in each round of voting. If a candidate receives an absolute majority
of the votes, they are declared as the winner. Otherwise, the candidate with the
lowest number of votes is eliminated and the next round of voting is carried out
between the remaining candidates. These steps are repeated until a candidate
receives an absolute majority.
The exhaustive ballot system is used among other places to elect the mem-
bers of the Swiss Federal Council [9], the President of the European Parlia-
ment [1], the speakers of the Canadian House of Commons [8], the British House
of Commons [11], and the Scottish Parliament [7], the host city of the Olympic
Games, and the host of the FIFA World Cup.
To avoid multiple rounds of voting, the voters can be asked to state their
preferences on the ballots. This is the basis for the following system.
In the instant run-off voting (IRV) system, the voters rank the can-
didates in order of preference. The ballots are then distributed between the
candidates based on their first preference votes. If a candidate receives more
than half of the ballots (i.e., the first preference votes), they are declared as the
winner. Otherwise, the candidate with the lowest number of allocated ballots is
eliminated and their allocated ballots are re-distributed (or transferred) to the
next ranked candidate on each ballot who is not yet eliminated. These steps
are repeated until a candidate is allocated an absolute majority of the ballots
and is declared the winner. The system is also known as the alternative vote
(AV).
The instant run-off electoral system is used among other places in the Aus-
tralian lower house elections [43], and the Irish presidential elections [13].
Partial ranking of the candidates might be allowed. In this case, all the
candidates ranked on a ballot might get eliminated before the final round. Such
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Table 1: An example of instant run-off voting (IRV): The 2014 mayoral election
results in Derwent Valley council, Tasmania, Australia
Candidates
PBe PBi MEv CLe FPe Exhausted Majority Remark
870 333 1632 423 620 0 1940 Count 1
+73 -333 +86 +60 +62 +52 PBi excluded
943 0 1718 483 682 52 1914 Count 2
+154 +147 -483 +135 +47 CLe excluded
1097 1865 0 817 99 1890 Count 3
+386 +307 -817 +124 FPe excluded
1483 2172 0 223 1828 Count 4
MEv elected
ballots are called exhausted ballots. The system guarantees an absolute majority
only among the ballots that are neither spoilt nor exhausted by the last round of
counting. On the other hand, voters might be asked to submit a full ranking of
all the candidates on the ballot so as to minimise exhausted and hence “wasted”
ballots. However, in practice this usually leads to an increase in the number of
invalid votes.
As an example of IRV, consider the results shown in Table 1 for the election
of mayor in Derwent Valley council from the 2014 Tasmanian local government
elections [6]. There were a total of 3878 valid ballots, which means the initial
quota for absolute majority was b3878/2c + 1 = 1940, where b·c denote the
floor function. The first five columns show the progressive total ballots for the
five candidates. As seen in the table, in the first count no candidate achieves
absolute majority, and hence the candidate with the lowest number of votes,
PBi, is eliminated. PBi’s 333 ballots are examined and transferred to their
respective second preferences: in this case, 73 to PBe, 86 to MEv, 60 to CLe,
and 62 to FPe. 52 ballots do not have a second preference stated, and hence are
exhausted. This means that in the next round the quota for absolute majority is
reduced to 1914. No candidate achieves majority in the second and third rounds
of voting and further 2 candidates are eliminated and their ballots transferred.
In the final round, MEv has 2172 ballots which is above the absolute majority
quota of 1828 and hence MEv is elected.
The IRV method discussed above is the single-winner version of an electoral
system known as the single transferable vote (STV) which we will discuss later
in this chapter. These methods were proposed by Thomas Hare [53], and hence
are sometimes collectively known simply as the Hare system.
While Hare’s method eliminates the candidate with the lowest first-preference
votes in each round, a variant called Coombs’ method [34] eliminates the can-
didate with the highest last-preference votes in each round. In other words, in
each round Hare excludes the least liked candidate, whereas Coombs excludes
the most disliked candidate.
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3 Some Solutions to Electing Multiple Winners
To elect multiple winners, one could of course simply extend the first-past-the-
post system and elect multiple candidates with the highest number of votes.
Let us assume the desired number of winners (or seats) is n.
In a block-vote (BV) system, a voter votes for up to n candidates. The
candidates are then ordered based on the number of votes they have received
and the first n candidates are declared winners. The system is also known as
plurality-at-large voting and multiple non-transferable vote (MNTV).
The system is used among other places in elections in Lebanon [76].
The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system can be seen as a
block-vote system in which the voters are restricted to vote for only one can-
didate. This system is used among other places in the Japanese upper house
elections [36].
A block-vote system in which the voters can vote for more than one but
fewer than n candidates is known as limited vote (LV). The Spanish upper
house elections uses this system, in which the voters may vote for up to three
candidates whereas four winners are elected [57].
Another variant of the block-vote, sometimes called the party block-vote
(PBV), requires voters to vote for a party (or in general a pre-determined list of
candidates) instead of voting directly for candidates. After the count, the party
with the highest number of votes is allocated all the n seats. This variant can
be thought of a first-past-the-post election between parties. It is used among
other places in Cameroon [70, Annex A] and Singapore [70, Annex A].
The party block-vote system, like many other systems based on the “winner
takes all” paradigm, may produce results that are significantly skewed towards
one or more popular parties. The underlying idea of the so-called propor-
tional representation (PR) electoral systems is to ensure that the number
of elected candidates from each party (or coalition of parties) is to some extent
proportional to their respective share of the votes.
In the list voting or more specifically party-list PR system, each party
presents a list of candidates and seats are allocated to each party in proportion
to the number of votes the party receives.
In what is known as the closed-list variant, the voters vote for a list, and
after the number of seats allocated to each party is determined, that number
of candidates on top of the party list are elected. Hence, the order in which
candidates get elected from each list is pre-determined merely by the party
and the voters do not get to choose it. The closed-list system is used among
other places in national parliamentary elections in Argentina [70, Annex A],
Portugal [35], Spain [57], and South Africa [51]. The system is also used in the
European parliament elections in many countries including Germany, France,
United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland), and Spain [82, Part 5].
On the other hand, in the open-list variant, the voters vote for candidates,
and the number of votes each candidate receives influences the order in which
candidates are chosen from party list at the end of the election. Since voter
preferences can influence the order of the elected candidates, such systems are
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also known as preferential list voting. There are multiple different deployments
of this variant which give the voter varying amount of influence. Hence, some
scholars suggest using the term “open list” exclusively for the systems in which
the order of elected candidates is solely determined by voter preferences, and
refer to the systems in which the order of elected candidates is determined
by a combination of party list orders and voter preferences as flexible list
voting (see e.g. [81, 49]). Open-list voting is used widely around the world
including in the Brazilian [66], Dutch [25], Czech [58], and Swedish [77] lower
house elections. The system is also used in the European parliament elections in
many countries including Italy, Poland, and the Netherlands [82, Part 5]. The
open-list systems used in Luxembourg and Switzerland parliamentary elections
are unique in that they allow for panachage, i.e., voters are allowed to split their
preferences between multiple parties [83, 59].
A two-round variant of the closed-list system is in use in French regional
elections [59]. Any party with at least a pre-determined threshold of the votes
may contest the second round. In the second round, the seats are allocated to
the parties proportionally to their shares of the votes.
There are various methods for seat allocation based on each party’s share
of the votes. The two most common categories are the highest average and the
largest remainder methods.
In the highest-average (HA) methods, the number of votes for each party
is successively divided by a set of divisors, resulting in a series of quotients called
averages. Eventually, n of the top values amongst the averages of all parties are
determined and the number of averages selected for each party gives their share
of the final n seats.
One of the most widely used highest-average methods is the d’Hondtmethod
in which the divisors are (1, 2, 3, 4, . . .). The method is used among many other
places in the Polish lower house elections [65]. Table 2 shows the results for
the lower house constituency of Częstochowa in the 2011 Polish parliamentary
elections according to the Polish national electoral commission [17]. The con-
stituency has seven seats. The first two columns show the parties with their
(rounded) percentage of valid votes. The third, fourth, and fifth columns show
the votes for each party divided by the divisors 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The
seven highest averages in the table, shown underlined, determine the number
of seats allocated to each party. For instance, since the PiS party has 2 of the
highest 7 averages, it wins 2 of the 7 seats. The idea here is that any change
in the allocated number of seats would put a party in disadvantage in terms of
average number of votes per seat. For example, PO’s 3 seats means they have
a seat on average for every 11.66% of votes, whereas if PO’s third seat were
allocated to PSL instead, it would mean that PSL would get a seat on average
for every 8.77% of the votes.
The Sainte-Laguë method is similar to the d’Hondt method, but uses
the divisors (1, 3, 5, 7, . . .) instead. Other highest average methods also fol-
low the same principle, but utilise different divisors. Among these are the
modified Sainte-Laguë method with divisors (1.4, 3, 5, 7, . . .), the Imperi-
ali method with divisors (2, 3, 4, 5, . . .), and the Danish method with divisors
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Table 2: An example of the d’Hondt method of proportional representation
voting: 2011 election results in the Częstochowa constituency, Poland
Party vote vote/2 vote/3 vote/4 seats
PO 34.97 17.49 11.66 8.74 3
PiS 27.36 13.68 9.12 6.84 2
RP 13.39 6.70 4.46 3.35 1
SLD 10.49 5.25 3.50 2.62 1
PSL 8.77 4.39 2.92 2.19 0
PJN 2.14 1.07 0.71 0.54 0
NP 2.06 1.03 0.69 0.52 0
PPP 0.84 0.42 0.28 0.21 0
(1, 4, 7, 10, . . .).
In the largest remainder (LR) methods, first a quota is calculated, rep-
resenting the number of votes required for a seat. Then the number of votes for
each party is divided by the quota to obtain a quotient consisting of an integer
and a fractional part. The fractional part is called a remainder. Each party is
allocated a number of initial seats equal to the integer part of their quotient.
This will amount for a total of ni initial seats. The remaining n − ni seats are
distributed between the n− ni parties with the largest remainders, giving each
such party an extra seat.
The Hare quota and the Droop quota are two widely used quotas in LR
systems. The Hare quota is calculated by dividing the total number of (valid)
votes to the number of seats. The Droop quota is calculated by dividing the
total number of (valid) votes to the number of seats plus one, and then then
adding 1 to the result. Fractions are usually disregarded in calculating quotas.
In other words, we have:
Hare quota =
⌊
no. of votes
no. of seats
⌋
and Droop quota = 1 +
⌊
no. of votes
1 + no. of seats
⌋
.
Other quotas that are used include the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota which is
one less than the Droop quota, and the Imperiali quota which is calculated by
dividing the number of votes to the number of seats plus two.
The Droop quota is used in the national and provincial elections in South
Africa [51]. Table 3 shows the Gauteng Provincial Legislature results in the
2014 South African National and Provincial Elections [12]. The table only
shows the first eight parties. The first two columns show the parties and their
respective number of votes. There are 73 seats to be allocated. The total
number of valid votes is 4,382,163. The Droop quota hence is calculated as
b4, 382, 163/(73 + 1)c + 1 = 59, 219. Dividing the votes for each party by the
quota gives the quotient, the number of initial seats (the integer part of the
quotient), and the remainder (the fractional part of the quotient). The total
number of initial seats is 68 which leaves 5 extra seats to be allocated to the 5
parties with the largest remainders, shown underlined in the table.
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Table 3: An example of the largest remainder method of proportional repre-
sentation using the Droop quota: 2011 Gauteng Provincial Legislature election
results, South Africa
Party votes quotient initial remainder extra total
seats seats seats
ANC 2,348,564 39.66 39 0.66 1 40
DA 1,349,001 22.78 22 0.78 1 23
EFF 451,318 7.62 7 0.62 1 8
VF+ 52,436 0.89 0 0.89 1 1
IFP 34,240 0.58 0 0.58 1 1
ACDP 27,196 0.46 0 0.46 0 0
COPE 21,652 0.37 0 0.37 0 0
NFP 20,733 0.35 0 0.35 0 0
The South African system is an example of a PR system without a threshold.
However, most PR systems require a threshold to be achieved for the party to
be eligible for any seats. The lower the threshold is, the more proportional the
results will be.
Some argue that in many of the systems discussed so far, especially if the
number of seats is relatively low, there is a potential for many votes to be
so-called “wasted”. For example, in Table 2, votes for the last four parties,
although counting for more than 10% of the votes, do not count toward electing
any candidate and are arguably wasted. The single transferable vote (STV)
system, which can be seen as a generalisation of the instant run-off (IRV) to elect
multiple winners aims to minimise votes being wasted by asking voters to declare
their preferences. This way, if a preferred candidate does not receive enough
support to be elected, the vote is transferred to the next preferred candidate
and finally counts towards electing one of the candidates on the voter’s list.
STV was first proposed in the 1850s by Thomas Hare [53].
In the single transferable vote (STV) system, the voters indicate their
preferences between the candidates by ranking them on the ballot. In each round
of counting if a candidate achieves a certain quota, they are elected. Otherwise,
the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated from the race. Then
either the elected candidate’s surplus votes or all of the eliminated candidate’s
votes are transferred to the next candidate appearing on the preference list who
is neither already elected nor already eliminated. The process continues until
either all seats are allocated or the number of candidates remaining in the race
is reduced to the number of remaining available seats.
STV is used in parliamentary elections in Ireland [48] and the upper house
elections in Australia at the national level [43], and in the Scottish local coun-
cil elections [29] and Tasmanian lower house elections [45] at the sub-national
level. The system is also used in the European parliament elections in Ireland,
Northern Ireland, and Malta [82, Part 5].
The quota normally used with STV is the Droop quota. Transferring ballots
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Table 4: An example of single transferable vote (STV) using the Droop quota:
2009 Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania (South) election results, Australia
Candidates
K M N S Exhausted Quota Remark
7 13 18 33 0 24 Count 1
+1.63 +4.09 +3.27 -9 S elected
8.63 17.09 21.27 24 0 24 Count 2
-7 +4 +3 K excluded
1.63 21.09 24.27 24 0 24 Count 3
N elected
for the eliminated candidates is similar to that of IRV. However, in case a
candidate achieves higher votes than the quota, their ballots above the quota
is called a surplus and may be transferred. One may think of this process as
transferring a portion of the elected candidate’s ballots that are not needed
for them to be elected. Hence, all the transferable ballots are examined, and
the share of each next preference from the surplus votes is determined. This
usually results in fractional ballot transfers between the candidates. The rules
governing when and how exactly the surplus transfers should be carried out are
different between elections in different countries.
Determining STV election winners can be complex and often consists of
tens of rounds of counting. Here however we consider a less complex example.
Table 4 shows the results of the 2009 Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania
elections in the South Region [21]. The total number of votes is 71, and two
candidates are to be chosen. Hence, the initial Droop quota is b71/3c+1 = 24.
As the table shows, in the first round, candidate S’s first preference votes are
more than enough to get them elected. Thus, S is declared elected in the first
round. However, since S only needs 24 votes to get elected, S’s surplus votes,
9 votes in this case, are transferred to their corresponding second preferences.
To do this fairly, all the 33 votes are examined. In this case, 6 of S’s ballots
list K as the second preference, 15 list M, and 12 list N. That is, 6/33 of any
transferring ballot should go to K, 15/33 to M, and 12/33 to N. Now that 9
ballots are transferring, 9(6/33) ≈ 1.63 ballots go to K, 9(15/33) ≈ 4.09 to
M, and 9(12/33) ≈ 3.27 to N. The totals in the second round do not push
any candidate above the quota, hence the candidate with the least votes, K, is
eliminated and K’s 7 votes are distributed, in this case, 4 to M and 3 to N. This
given N enough votes to be declared the second winner.
The above example was a rather straightforward case of determining STV
winners. However, note that in many cases for instance if there are multiple
winners in any round, or if there are exhausted ballots and hence the quota
changes, there could be different methods for how and when to transfer votes.
Although the difference between such different methods might seem insignifi-
cant, they may lead to different outcomes in the election. The transfer rules are
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usually agreed on and published in detail before the election, and as mentioned
before, they vary considerably between different jurisdictions.
4 Blending Systems Together
Elections with single-member districts are praised for clearly tying a represen-
tative to a constituency and hence fostering a higher degree of accountability
for elected representatives. On the other hand, elections with multi-member
districts using proportional representation (PR) systems such as party-list are
designed to produce results in which the number of seats each party wins is to
a great extent proportional to the party’s share of popular vote. To combine
the positive aspects of these two types of systems, many jurisdictions run two
systems alongside each other.
In a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, one voting method
is used for electing individual representatives for each constituency, and besides
this first method, a second PR method is used to compensate for any dispro-
portionality produced by the constituency results. In some MMP systems, the
voter is able to vote in each method separately. In other systems however, the
voter votes for the constituency representative only, and the party vote is calcu-
lated by aggregating the candidate votes in all of the constituencies in a larger
PR district. There may be a single national PR district or several sub-national
ones.
The MMP system is used among other places in parliamentary elections
in Germany [75], Hungary [30], Mexico [39], and New Zealand [84], which use
combinations of first-past-the-post and list-PR.
In a two-tier system, two parallel and independent methods are used:
one voting method is used for electing individual representatives for each con-
stituency, and a PR method is used to elect members proportional to party vote
shares independently of how many seats the parties win at constituency level.
The PR method districts are larger than the constituencies, usually several sub-
national districts or a single national district. Two-tier systems are also known
simply as parallel systems.
The two-tier system is used in parliamentary elections among other places
in South Korea [72], Japan [69], and Thailand [55], which use first-past-the-
post alongside list-PR, and in Lithuania [65], which use the two-round system
alongside list-PR.
5 Other Solutions
In this section, we review some of the other systems that are less widely-used
in national and sub-national elections.
In the Borda count, each voter ranks the candidates on the ballot. The
candidates each get a number of points based on their rank, according to a
point allocation scheme which is decreasing with respect to rank. For instance,
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if there are k candidates on the ballot, the i-th ranked candidate is allocated
k−i points, i.e., k−1, k−2, . . . , 0 points respectively for candidates in the order
of preference. The points each candidate receives in all ballots are summed up
and the candidate with the highest sum of points is declared the winner.
This system is used in a few political elections around the world includ-
ing Nauru [71] and Kiribati [71], and other places such as the Eurovision Song
Contest [24]. In Slovenia, the Borda count, which is used to elect the repre-
sentatives for the Hungarian and Italian-speaking ethnic minorities, allocates
k + 1− i points to the i-th ranked candidate, i.e., k, k − 1, . . . , 1 points respec-
tively for candidates in the order of preference. In parliamentary elections in
Nauru, the the i-th ranked candidate is allocated 1/i points, i.e., 1, 12 , . . . ,
1
k
points respectively for candidates in the order of preference.
In the cumulative voting system, each voter has a fixed number of points
to share between a number of candidates, and the single or multiple candidates
receiving the highest total points are declared winners.
Cumulative voting is used among other places in Norfolk Island Legislative
Assembly elections where each voter gets nine votes to share between the candi-
dates with the restriction that no more than two votes can be given to any single
candidate [28]. Besides, the system is used in some local elections in the United
States (see e.g. [2, 4]), and also in board elections in corporate governance (see
e.g. [33, p. 270]), where typically each share-holder is given a number of votes
proportional to their share.
In a range voting system, the voter rates the candidates on the ballot,
i.e., gives each a score, and the candidate with the highest sum of scores is
declared the winner. Approval voting can be seen as an instance of range voting
in which only binary scores, i.e., approve or disapprove, are allowed. A variant
called majority judgement calculates the winner based on the median score
for each candidate.
Range voting is used in scoring some sports competitions such as figure skat-
ing [15] and gymnastics [10] where a truncated mean of the scores from multiple
judges determines the final results. It is also used in web-based scoring and
recommendation systems such as the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) where a
weighted mean of the individual scores determines the final scores [14].
In Condorcet methods, the voter usually ranks the candidates, and Con-
dorcet winner is the candidate, if any, which is pair-wise preferred to all other
candidates by the majority of voters. The Condorcet winner is not guaranteed
to exist. Any method that elects the Condorcet winner, if any, is generally
known as a Condorcet method. A Condorcet method for n candidates can be
thought of as running 12n(n− 1) simple majority elections between all possible
pairs of candidates, and finding if there is a candidate that beats all other in
their corresponding head-to-head election.
There are various methods to calculate the Condorcet winner if any, and
otherwise produce a plausible replacement winner. For instance, in the method
known as Smith/IRV, the counting produces a so called Smith set, defined as
the smallest non-empty set of candidates such that every candidate in the set
defeats every candidate outside the set in a pair-wise election. The Condorcet
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winner is guaranteed to be in the Smith set. Hence, if the Smith set includes
only one candidate, that candidate is declared the Condorcet winner. If the
Condorcet winner does not exist, then the IRV method is used to elect a winner
between the candidates in the Smith set.
In the system known as Black’s method if the Condorcet winner exists,
they are declared the winner, and otherwise the Borda count is used to calculate
the winner.
Another Condorcet method known as the Schulze method [79] involves
finding preference paths between candidates and comparing them based on the
so-called “strength” of the paths. The method outputs a complete ordering of
the candidate and hence can be used to elect multiple candidates.
Condorcet methods, and specifically the Schulze method, are fairly popular
within the free software and free culture communities, and for instance are used
in the internal elections of the several national Pirate Parties [74, p. 213], the
Debian project [5], Ubuntu [22], KDE [16], and the Free Software Foundation
Europe [3].
6 Which Systems Are Good?
Every one of us might have already had a favourite electoral system before
reading this chapter, or might have set our mind on one while reading the
chapter. We might think that our favourite system is obviously superior to the
others we know of and have our reasons supporting our argument. However,
social choice theorists on the one hand and electoral assistance experts on the
other hand would be able to provide a variety of counter arguments pointing
towards the weaknesses of our favourite system compared to other systems.
In this section we aim to go through some of the better known comparative
strengths and weaknesses of the electoral systems we have discussed, from both
the theoretical and practical points of view.
6.1 A Theorist’s Point of View
Social choice theory provides a variety of results on the merits of different elec-
toral systems. Some of these results are naturally expected, while some utterly
unexpected. Nonetheless, the results are interesting on both sides, either provid-
ing a solid theoretical foundation to build upon in the former case, or challenging
our common understanding of such systems and compelling us to rethink and
design better systems in the latter case.
6.1.1 Majority Rules
Let us first limit our attention to elections with only two candidates. Perhaps
one of the expected, and yet illuminating early results in this case is May’s
theorem, which pretty much settles the question of which system is the best
choice in elections with two candidates. To define a notion of a good system,
let us start by defining the following criteria:
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• a system is called egalitarian1 if it treats all voters equally;
• a system is called neutral (with respect to candidates) if it treats all can-
didates equally;
• a system is called monotone if the candidate who wins an election would
still win if one or more voters change their vote in favour of the winning
candidate and everyone else votes the same way; in other words, it is
impossible for a winning candidate to become a losing candidate by gaining
votes; and
• a system is called nearly decisive if the only situation a tie can occur is
when the two candidate receive exactly the same number of votes.
The above criteria seem quite natural to expect from a good electoral system.
In fact, May has shown that the simple majority system is the only system that
can satisfy all four criteria [62].
Theorem 1 (May’s theorem) In an election with two candidates, the only
electoral system that is egalitarian, neutral, monotone, and nearly decisive is
the simple majority method.
May’s theorem is definitive on that the simple majority system is the only system
that could satisfy the above reasonable requirements. In fact, even if we do not
care about the electoral system being decisive, an extension of May’s theorem
states that the only two-candidate electoral systems that are egalitarian, neutral,
and monotone are the following ones: simple majority, super-majority, and a
third nonsensical system which results in a tie regardless of the number of votes
for the two candidates [73, p. 20]. On the other hand, if we define a (strictly)
decisive system to be one that always produces a winner (i.e., never ends in a tie),
then it is not hard to see that the three properties of equality, neutrality, and
decisiveness are inherently contradictory; that is, there is no electoral system
for two candidates that is egalitarian, neutral, and decisive. This statement is
true even when elections with more than two candidates are considered. This
leads us to believe that (strict) decisiveness might be too strong a requirement
to expect from an electoral system.
6.1.2 Bad News Begins
Now consider elections with more than two candidates and a single winner.
Equality and neutrality can still be defined similarly. Equality can be formalised
by requiring that the outcome of the election stays the same if any two voters
exchange their ballots. Similarly, neutrality can be formalised by requiring that
if candidate A is replaced with candidate B on all ballots, and vice versa, i.e.,
candidate B is also replaced with candidate A on all ballots, then the same
replacements are replicated in the outcome of the election.
1This criterion is often called anonymity in modern social choice theory. We use May’s
original term to avoid confusion with anonymity from the security viewpoint.
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Formalising monotonicity in the case of more than two candidates needs to
be elaborated on to define a precise sense of the voters changing their votes
in favour of the winning candidate. In the case of only two candidates, it is
clear that this means changing a vote for the losing candidate to a vote for
the winning candidate. For an election with more than two candidates, let us
consider the rather general case where voters rank the candidates on the ballots.
We can now specify what is meant by changing a vote in favour of the winning
candidate as changing the rank of the winning candidate on a ballot with the
rank of a losing candidate which is ranked higher than the winning candidate,
and vice versa.
Let us now define more criteria to assess our electoral system against. All
of these are criteria that we would naturally want a good system satisfy.
• a system satisfies the majority criterion if whenever a candidate receives
a majority of the first preferences, the system elects B as the winner;
• a system satisfies the Condorcet criterion if it elects the Condorcet winner
whenever such a winner exists;
• a system satisfies the Pareto criterion (also called unanimity) if whenever
every voter prefers candidate A to candidate B, the system does not elect
B as the winner; and
• a system satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) crite-
rion if the following holds: consider an election in which A is elected the
winner, and a second election in which all voters rank A above or be-
low B the same way they have done in the first election, but may change
their preferences of other candidates; the system must not choose B as
the winner in the second election; in other words, IIA requires that the
electoral system’s preference between any two candidates depends only on
the individual voters’ preferences between those two candidates.
Note that if a candidate receives a majority of first preferences, the candidate
beats all other candidates in head-to-head contests, and hence is the Condorcet
winner. Thus, the Condorcet criterion is a stronger criterion than the major-
ity criterion, i.e., the Condorcet criterion implies the majority criterion. In
fact, the Condorcet and IIA criteria are incompatible as stated by the following
theorem [73, p. 55].
Theorem 2 There is no electoral system for an election with more than two
candidates that satisfies both the Condorcet and the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) criteria.
The above theorem is one of several impossibility results in social choice
theory. Each of these results shows the impossibility of electoral systems satis-
fying a set of criteria simultaneously. Such results can be seen as a contributing
reason why the debate over the merits of different electoral systems is far from
settled. A fundamental issue with distilling a social preference from a set of
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individual preferences which eventually is responsible for many such results is
the following observation.
The Condorcet paradox is the observation that majority preferences can
be “irrational” (specifically, intransitive), even when individual preferences are
“rational” (specifically, transitive).
To see an example of this paradox, consider an election with three candidates
A, B, and C. Assume we have three voters whose preferences are as follows. The
first voter prefers A to B, and B to C, and since we are assuming rational voters,
also A to C; or in shorthand A  B  C. The second voter’s preferences are
B  C  A, and the third voter’s C  A  B. Now the majority of voters
prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. This means that although the individual
preferences are transitive, the majority preference is intransitive.
6.1.3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
A well-known impossibility result which has been described as “the single most
important result in the history of voting theory” [56] is Arrow’s impossibility
theorem. Arrow considers electoral systems that provide a full ranking of the
candidates as outcome. He defines the following criteria in addition to the ones
we have discussed so far:
• a system satisfies the unrestricted domain criterion (or universality, the
term originally used by Arrow) if it does not place any restriction other
than transitivity on how voters can rank the candidates;
• a system satisfies the non-imposition criterion (or citizen sovereignty, the
term originally used by Arrow) if its outcome is not restricted (i.e., not
imposed) in any way other than being transitive; in other words, every
transitive outcome is possible in the election depending on individual or-
derings; and
• a system satisfies the non-dictatorship criterion if there is no single voter
(i.e., a dictator) whose vote determines the outcome of the election re-
gardless of how others vote.
Note that non-dictatorship is a weaker criterion than equality, i.e., equality
implies non-dictatorship.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem basically says that the only unrestricted-
domain electoral systems which are monotone and independent of irrelevant
alternatives are either imposed or dictatorial [26].
Theorem 3 (Arrow’s impossibility theorem) There is no electoral system
for an election with more than two candidates that satisfies the unrestricted
domain, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criteria
and is neither imposed nor dictatorial.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is pretty strong in ruling out the possibility
of existence of any fair electoral system that satisfies three reasonable criteria
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that one may expect from a good system. It can be even stated in a stronger
form since monotonicity, IIA, and non-imposition together imply the Pareto
criterion. In its stronger form, the theorem basically says unrestricted domain,
Pareto, and IIA properties are incompatible [56].
Theorem 4 (Arrow’s impossibility theorem (strong form)) There is no
electoral system for an election with more than two candidates that satisfies the
unrestricted domain, Pareto, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
criteria and is not dictatorial.
Although Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that certain desirable criteria
are incompatible with each other, what it does not say is that there are no
reasonable systems around. The question of choosing the right system hence
becomes that of the choices we make between the desirable criteria to achieve a
compromise.
One possible compromise would be to consider systems in which the voter’s
ranking of candidates is restricted in some way, and hence the system does not
support an unrestricted domain. Of course this should be done in a way that
neutrality is still kept intact. An example of such a system is the approval
electoral system in which candidate rankings on the ballots are restricted to
either approval or lack thereof. By compromising on the unrestricted domain
criterion, approval voting is able to achieve monotonicity, Pareto, and IIA. Note
that the Condorcet paradox is absent in the setting of approval voting since
collective preference, as defined by comparing the number of approvals for each
candidate, is transitive.
When faced with a choice between Pareto and IIA, the more accepted view
seems to support a compromise on IIA. IRV and Borda are both examples of
systems which do not restrict voter’s rankings of candidates in any way and
at the same time achieve Pareto and provide some guarantees comparatively
weaker than IIA.
6.1.4 Gibbard–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
Consider a single-winner election with three candidates A, B, and C using the
Borda count. Assume A and B are the only main contenders with a realistic
chance of winning. Consider a voter, Alice, whose preferences are as follows: 1st
A, then B, and C last. If Alice reflects her preferences as they are on the ballot
box, i.e., she puts A  B  C on the ballot, it is said that she votes sincerely.
However, knowing that the realistic race is only between A and B, it would make
sense for Alice to mark A  C  B on her ballot to give her first preference a
better chance of winning. This would be a case of so-called strategic or tactical
voting in which considering contextual information the voter misrepresents her
preferences on the ballot to favour a candidate over a relatively less preferred
candidate.
It is often argued that a electoral system should ideally ensure that, no mat-
ter the contextual circumstances, the best voting strategy for a voter always is
voting sincerely, i.e., reflecting their actual preferences. However, a significant
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theoretical result known as the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem rules out the ex-
istence of such ideal electoral systems altogether under some natural conditions.
In the following we briefly discuss this theorem.
Let us for the moment limit our attention to single-winner systems only.
A basic fairness criterion is to require that every candidate should be able to
win. In the following the definition of this criterion is listed along with that of
strategy-proofness.
• a system is said to have an unrestricted range if its winner can be any
candidate; and
• a system is said to be strategy-proof (or non-manipulable) if there are
circumstances under which strategic voting by a voter leads to a winner
which is actually preferred by the voter to a candidate that will win if the
voter votes sincerely.
Mathematically, an unrestricted range is equivalent to the voting function being
surjective or onto. Having an unrestricted range can be seen as a form of the
non-imposition criterion for single-winner systems. Note that neutrality implies
an unrestricted range, so having an unrestricted range can be thought of as
a relaxation of neutrality. Yet Gibbard and Satterthwaite have independently
shown that even under such a relaxed version of neutrality there is no strategy-
proof electoral system other than dictatorship [50, 78].
Theorem 5 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem) There is no unrestricted range
electoral system for an election with more than two candidates that is strategy-
proof and is not dictatorial.
The results of Gibbard and Satterthwaite further demonstrate a one-to-one
correspondence between strategy-proof systems and systems satisfying Arrow’s
criteria. Duggan and Schwartz have proved a generalised version of the theorem
not restricted to single-winner systems [40].
In light of such impossibility results, and with completely strategy-proof
systems out of the question, electoral systems may be examined based on the
specific manipulation strategies to which they are prone. The choice of a sys-
tem can then be made based on the occurring probability and severity of such
possible manipulation strategies in the contextual circumstances of a specific
election.
6.1.5 Systems with Respect to Criteria
Table 5 lists selected electoral systems and criteria they do and do not satisfy.
A tick (3) indicates that the system on that row always satisfies the criterion on
that column, whereas a cross (7) indicates that the system does not necessarily
satisfy the criterion. The criteria discussed in this chapter and presented in the
table are a selective set of those discussed in social choice theory.
Note that, assuming that voters do not change their minds between multiple
rounds of an election, the TRS and contingent votes can be thought of as the
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Table 5: Selected electoral system and criteria they satisfy
System Equ. Neu. Maj. Con. Mon. Par. IIA
FPTP 3 3 3 7 3 3 7
Approval 3 3 7 7 3 3 3
TRS 3 3 3 7 7 3 7
Contingent 3 3 3 7 7 3 7
Exhaustive 3 3 3 7 7 3 7
IRV 3 3 3 7 7 3 7
Borda 3 3 7 7 3 3 7
Cumulative 3 3 7 7 3 3 7
Schulze 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
same system in theory, and hence the two systems have the same properties in
Table 5. The same statement is also true about the exhaustive vote and IRV
systems.
In some cases, it is easy to see why a system satisfies a specific criterion;
e.g., a candidate that achieves a majority obviously achieves a plurality as well,
and hence FPTP satisfies the majority criterion. In other cases, the reason for
a tick or a cross might be less obvious. We leave the task of justifying the ticks
to the reader, but give some counter-examples to explain some of the crosses
in the following. Figure 1 contains the counter-examples we are going to use
to this end. Each counter-example is a profile of an election which specifies
the number of voters that have a specific candidate preference. For instance,
the profile indicated as “Election 1” basically says 4 voters have the preference
A  B  C, 2 the preference B  C  A, and 3 the preference C  B  A.
Consider Election 1 in Figure 1. A FPTP election would record 4 votes for
A, 2 for B, and 3 for C, and hence the FPTP winner would be A. However,
in one-on-one elections, B would beat both A and C, 5–4 and 6–3 respectively,
and hence B is the Condorcet winner. In fact even C beats A 5–4 in a head-
to-head election, which means FPTP might even elect a Condorcet loser, i.e.,
a candidate that loses against all other candidates in head-to-head elections.
Also note that if the third group change their preference from C  B  A to
B  C  A, the winner of FPTP will change to B, despite the fact that the
voters who have changed their mind still rank A the same way with respect to
B and C, i.e., they still think C  A and B  A. Thus FPTP does not satisfy
the Condorcet and IIA criteria.
Consider Election 2 in Figure 1 from [67]. With either two-round system
(TRS) or instant run-off voting (IRV), C is eliminated in the first round, and in
the second round between A and B, C’s votes go to A and hence A wins the TRS
or IRV elections. Now consider the case where A is able to gain the support of
the last group of 2 voters and change their preference to A  B  C. In that
case, B gets eliminated in the first round, and in the second round C beats A
9–8. Thus, A loses the second election despite gaining votes. This shows that
TRS and IRV (and hence the contingent and exhaustive vote systems) are not
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Election 1
4 2 3
A B C
B C B
C A A
Election 2
6 5 4 2
A C B B
B A C A
C B A C
Election 3
30 1 29 10 10 1
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A
Figure 1: Counter-examples of election profiles
monotone.
If any of the four systems above, i.e., TRS, IRV, contingent, or exhaustive,
is used to elect the winner in Election 1 in Figure 1, the Condorcet winner B
will be eliminated in the first round and C will be the eventual winner. Hence,
these systems do not necessarily elect the Condorcet winner.
Consider Election 3 in Figure 1 from Condorcet [38]. It is not hard to see that
A is the Condorcet winner but using the standard Borda count, i.e., allocating
2, 1, and 0 points for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd preferences respectively, elects B
as the winner. In fact, even in a generalised Borda count where pi points are
allocated for the i-th preference, A receives 31p1 + 39p2 + 11p3 points and B
39p1+31p2+11p3 points. Since p1 needs to be greater than p2 for the system to
make sense, this example shows that no generalised Borda count can guarantee
electing the Condorcet winner.
Approval voting is a bit trickier in that the outcome of the election not
only depends on voter preferences, but also on the number of candidates each
voter approves. This means, unlike some other systems such as FPTP, TRS,
and Borda, in an approval voting election for each election profile there might
be multiple possible outcomes based on voters’ behaviour. For instance, in
Election 1 in Figure 1, if all voters only approve their top candidate, A would
win the election, whereas if all voters approve their top two candidates, B would
win, and at the same time, if the first and third groups of voters approve one
candidate and the second group approve two, then C would win. A similar
situation may happen even if a candidate has a majority. Thus, approval voting
without any restriction on how many candidates may be approved by voters
does not satisfy the majority and Condorcet criteria.
All counter-examples used for FPTP and Borda may be also used for cumu-
lative voting since both FPTP and Borda can be seen as instances of cumulative
voting.
6.2 A Practitioner’s Point of View
In practice, electoral systems are usually broadly categorised as majoritarian,
proportional, and mixed systems. Majoritarian systems are based on the general
principle that a single candidate with a plurality of votes is elected to represent
and pursue the demands of a specific (usually geographic) constituency. FPTP,
TRS, IRV, and other similar systems hence fall in this category. Proportional
systems on the other hand, are based on the general principle that the elected
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body of candidates proportionally reflects the diverse range of views in a hetero-
geneous society. This category includes multiple list voting systems and STV,
although STV is sometimes referred to as semi-proportional. Mixed systems
aim to attain the best of both worlds by incorporating elements from the above
two types of systems. MMP and two-tier systems are examples of mixed sys-
tems. This categorisation is a general guide and some systems, most notably
SNTV, do not seem to fit in any of the categories.
The underlying principles of the majoritarian and proportional systems cor-
respond to two different conceptions of “representation”: principal–agent and
microcosm, as put forth by McLean [63]. The principal–agent conception defines
representation as an agent acting on behalf of a principal, whereas the microcos-
mic conception defines representation as statistically typifying the group being
represented. McLean argues that the two conceptions are each entirely reason-
able but inconsistent with each other.
Rae distinguished three main components of an electoral system: district
magnitude, electoral formula, and ballot structure [68]. District magnitude refers
to the number of candidates elected in each electoral district; electoral formula
is the algorithm used to calculate the winner(s); and ballot structure refers to
the information collected from the voter on a ballot. Rae further argues that
classification of electoral systems often deals with only one component, namely
the electoral formula, and leaves the other two out, whereas district magnitude
and ballot structure have significant effects on how an electoral system performs.
Based on district magnitude, systems can be classified into single-member and
multi-member district systems. Different ballot structures on the other hand
lead to categorising systems based on three aspects: first, the number of votes
allowed: either one, more than one but less than the number of seats, or equal
to the number of candidates or seats, second, the type of information the voter
is asked to provide: either nominal, ordinal, or cardinal, and third, for whom
the votes votes: either for individuals or for groups of individuals (e.g., par-
ties) [31]. Systems using nominal ballots (i.e., voting for one option) include
FPTP, TRS, and closed-list PR; systems using ordinal ballots (i.e., ranking the
options) include IRV, STV, and Borda count; and systems using cardinal ballots
(i.e., rating the options) include approval and range voting.
Majoritarian systems are praised for their ability to produce a clear tie be-
tween an elected candidate and a constituency, which in turn implies a clear re-
sponsibility and accountability of the elected candidate towards the constituency.
Besides, most majoritarian systems (with e.g., IRV being an exception) are sim-
ple to understand and do not require complex mathematics to calculate the
results, and hence they are considered to encourage transparency. However,
such systems tend to favour large parties and do not usually produce results
that reflect the shares of votes received by different parties. Thus, minority
groups and smaller parties may not be able to win any seat and are encouraged
to integrate into the larger parties. In some contexts, e.g., when there are two
dominant parties, this can be seen as a positive feature since it produces a clear
winner and hence a strong and stable government as well as a strong opposition
and government alternative.
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Proportional systems on the other hand emphasise on accurately represent-
ing the make-up of diverse electorates. The greater the number of candidates
to be elected from an electoral district, the more proportional the results tend
to be. Such systems should result in governing coalitions that represent a wide
range of views in the political scene, although in some contexts, negotiations
to build a coalition may take a long time. Proportional systems tend to facil-
itate fragmentation of the party system. Besides, since multi-member districts
are required to guarantee any degree of proportionality, proportional systems
usually lack the clear link between a specific candidate and the constituency.
In contrast with proportionality, the greater the number of candidates to be
elected from an electoral district, the weaker such links tend to be.
While the principal–agent and microcosmic conceptions describe an elected
body’s collective role in representing the electors, an elected candidate’s individ-
ual representative role may be defined as that of either a delegate or a trustee. A
delegate in this characterisation is expected to listen to and reflect the views of
the electors, whereas a trustee is thought to be entrusted by the electors to use
their own judgement and decide on behalf of the electors. Farrell argues that in
“party-based” electoral systems there is a greater tendency for elected represen-
tatives to act as trustees, whereas comparatively in “candidate-based” systems
there is more incentive for elected representatives to act as delegates [44].
Majoritarian systems are considered more susceptible to strategic voting
compared to proportional systems. In a FPTP system for example, a voter
might vote for a candidate that they do not prefer but think has a better chance
to win. Proportional systems on the other hand, are considered to encourage
voters to declare their actual preferences.
Majoritarian systems, specially those using single-member districts, are prone
to district boundary irregularities, known as malapportionment and gerryman-
dering, that might arise as a result of the process of district delimitation [44,
pp. 202–205]. Malapportionment refers to the situations in which there are im-
balances between the populations of different electoral districts that favour one
party over others. Gerrymandering refers to the practice of (re)drawing electoral
boundaries in shapes that is expected to disproportionately boost the number
of seats won by a specific party. Some proportional systems, specially those
using smaller multi-member districts, are susceptible to such irregularities as
well. Generally speaking, the greater the number of candidates to be elected in
districts, the less they have the potential to suffer from malapportionment and
gerrymandering [56, Ch. 10]. These issues however may be resolved by putting
a neutral body in charge of district delimitation.
A widely-accepted characterisation is that of Duverger who argues that the
single-ballot plurality systems favour party dualism, whereas two-round major-
ity systems and proportional systems favour multipartism [41]. He further ar-
gues that majoritarian systems may encourage “personality parties”, i.e., those
based on a leader’s popularity, and geographic minority parties, whereas propor-
tional systems generally encourage “permanent minority parties”, such as ethnic
or religious ones, but discourage “personality parties”. The effects of mixed sys-
tems are less understood as these systems only relatively recently have been
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adopted by a considerable number of countries.
Proportional systems tend to be more accommodating in adjusting repre-
sentation towards historically under-represented groups and minorities. In es-
tablished democracies, systems based on multi-member districts have shown a
strong increase in women’s representation, whereas this trend is much weaker
in systems based on single-member districts [61].
Votes that do not count towards the election of any candidate are usually
referred to as wasted votes. Systems such as FPTP tend to leave a larger
number of wasted voted, whereas proportional systems with low thresholds,
IRV, and STV aim to reduce the number of wasted votes. A related issue is
vote splitting, and it happens when similar candidates compete in an election and
their potential supporters votes tend to be split between them, which possibly
allows a candidate representing a less popular overall viewpoint win. FPTP
particularly suffers from this issue, whereas TRS is considered less susceptible
and proportional systems with low thresholds, IRV, and STV are considered
relatively immune to vote splitting.
The two-round system is unique among the discussed systems in that it
possibly requires the electoral administration to run a second election in a short
period, hence significantly increasing the election cost. On the other hand, this
unique property enables voters to change their mind from the first round to the
second and accelerate consensus building between parties to coalesce behind the
candidates in the second round.
Among the multiple highest average (HA) seat allocation methods for list
electoral systems, the Danish method is considered to comparatively favour
smaller parties, the Sainte-Laguë method is considered neutral, the modified
Sainte-Laguë and Imperiali methods are considered to favour larger parties, and
the d’Hondt method is considered to favour larger parties the most. Among the
largest remainder (LR) methods, smaller quotas are more favourable to larger
parties. Considering all proportional systems, it has been shown that they can
be generally ordered from the most to the least favourable to the larger parties
as follows [47]: LR using Imperiali quota, d’Hondt, STV, LR using Droop quota,
modified Sainte-Laguë, LR using Hare quota and Sainte-Laguë, and finally the
Danish method.
Mixed systems tend to produce election results that, in terms of propor-
tionality, fall between majoritarian and proportional systems. However, some
criticise such systems for effectively creating two classes of elected candidates
with different mandates and hence undermining the cohesiveness of the elected
body of representatives.
Among the systems that do not fall in the three categories mentioned above,
SNTV is considered to be easy to understand, to accommodate the representa-
tion of minority parties better compared to majoritarian systems, and to frag-
ment the party system less compared to proportional systems. However, SNTV
tend to result in many wasted votes, and parties need to consider complex
strategic decisions as to how many candidates to put forth as the system suffers
from issues similar to vote splitting.
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